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Abstract: China has experimented with two strategies of reform of its state-owned enterprises
(SOE). One is diversification of SOEs’ ownership through introducing non-state sources of
investment. Another is to improve the management of SOEs by granting SOEs’ managers
autonomy and their employees profit incentives. Utilising a data set on 680 SOEs over 1980-94,
we tested the relative effectiveness of two kinds of reform measures. Our results show that
ownership diversification had a significant impact on the performance of SOEs while efforts to
improve SOE’s management had very little effect. Moreover, the impact of ownership
diversification on SOE’s economic performance was as strong as that of enhancing product market
competition.
No matter whether it is black or white, a cat that catches mice is a good cat.
Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leader
I INTRODUCTION
S
tate-owned enterprises (SOEs), which refer to the enterprises with
majority government ownership and under direct government control,
continue to be difficult targets of reform in many economies under reform. In
China, despite many years of reform, SOEs still drag on the economy by
occupying 70 per cent of bank credits, employing 50 per cent of non-
agricultural labour force, but producing less than 25 per cent of total
industrial output.1
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1Although we are mostly concerned with SOE reform in transition economies, the same issue is
also of great importance in industrialised economies. The discussions on SOEs in OECD countries
can be found in Toninelli (2000).
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continuous debates on strategies of SOE reform in the academic community.
In the debates, two schools of thought stand out. They have distinct
explanations of the sources of the inefficiency of SOEs and the best approaches
to reforming them. One school can be called the ownership school. According to
this school, SOEs are intrinsically inefficient. It is because they are controlled
by government agencies and government agencies are bad “owners”, causing a
litany of bad SOE behaviour. Thus, the key of the SOE reform is to separate
the government from the SOE. Privatisation, broadly defined, is essential to
achieve this goal. Many economists have long articulated this view. For
example, in his analysis of the former socialist system, Kornai (1992) has
maintained that the root problem of the inefficiencies of socialism and of state
enterprises is bureaucratic control. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)
blame politicians’ influence of enterprise decisions for the inefficiency of state
enterprises. 
The other school believes that “nothing is intrinsically inefficient about
SOEs”. SOEs are no different from those listed companies in market
economies, such as IBM, with widely spread public ownership. The reason that
SOEs are inefficient, according to this school, is because the government as a
large shareholder has not been effective in managing its investment in SOEs.
Therefore, the solution is to improve government’s management of SOEs.
Possible measures include granting SOE managerial autonomy and linking
the bonus of SOE employees to enterprise performance. We call this the
management school.
Despite the long-standing and sharp division between the two schools of
thought on SOE reform, there has been little empirical research aimed at
testing directly the validity of the theories.  Instead, most of existing empirical
research has been embedded in one of the two schools. For example, Barberis
et al. (1996) tested the mechanism through which privatisation of Russian
shops improves efficiency. Frydman et al. (1999) were also concerned with the
impact of privatisation on firm performance.  
On the other hand, Groves et al. (1994 and 1995) examined how granting
autonomy and profit incentives to SOE managers improve SOE performance
and how improving managerial incentives improve SOE efficiency. Li (1997)
measured how managerial reform and increased market competition enhance
SOE’s efficiency. While testing the importance of managerial reform, these
authors do not consider the factor of ownership changes.
The purpose of the paper is to test empirically the two schools of thought
on SOE reform. We were able to do so because of a unique data set on China’s
SOE. The data set tracks 680 Chinese state-owned enterprises over 15 years.
Departing from the large amount of empirical research on China’s SOE
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and ownership reform were implemented in China during this 15 year period.  
Ownership reform in China was not in the form of a large-scale and
thorough privatisation. Instead, ownership changes in Chinese state enter-
prises came about by introducing non-government sources of investment
funds. State enterprises were allowed to raise funds from their employees,
foreign investors, non-state enterprises, and outside individual investors. As a
result, state enterprises in China have undergone steady changes in
ownership over time. The state ownership has been gradually diluted while
the non-state owners penetrated into the enterprises. Managerial reforms
were also implemented concurrently. Through observation of enterprises
undergoing both kinds of reforms, we are able to evaluate the relative
importance of each kind of reform.
Our empirical tests reveal the following findings. First, non-state
ownership shares in a state enterprise is a significant – both statistically and
economically – predictor of the enterprises’ performance. The higher the non-
state shares, the better the economic performance of the enterprise. Second,
contrary to the results reported in Groves et al. (1994, 1995), we find that
managerial autonomy and incentives are insignificant for improving state
enterprise’ performance once the ownership changes were controlled.  Third,
product market competition has a significant and positive impact on
enterprise performance.
In the next section, we discuss the institutional changes in China’s
enterprise reforms. Section III will discuss the dataset and the research
methodology. The results are reported in Section IV, which is followed by
concluding remarks.
II THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S STATE ENTERPRISE REFORM
In comparison with other transition economies, China not only has had
one of the longest histories of state enterprise reform but also has
experimented with a variety of reform measures in the process. The entire
period of state enterprise reform can be roughly divided into three stages. In
the first stage of the reform, which lasted throughout the whole 1980s, the
thinking of the managerial school of reform was espoused and many reform
measures were implemented. The most common was the so-called contract
responsibility system, in which SOE managers or all the employees of an
enterprise were asked to sign performance contracts with the supervising
government agencies. A contract typically specified how much profit and tax
an enterprise must remit to the government agency and, in return, how much
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serious trouble and stalled gradually due to the wide spread renegotiation of
government-enterprise contracts.
The second stage of China’s state enterprise reform was implemented in
the first half of the 1990s, and was aimed at separating SOEs’ daily
management from direct government intervention. The objective was
preventing government agencies from issuing administrative commands to
SOEs. To implement that measure, many SOEs were incorporated as
independent legal entities. As a result, the government agencies that had been
the supervisors of SOEs became SOEs’ equity holders. The government
agencies distanced themselves from day-to-day operations of the SOEs. 
Although the intellectual impulse behind this reform measure was still the
managerial school, corporatisation opened up avenues to diversify the
ownership structure of SOEs. For example, as a corporation, an SOE could
raise funds from employees, independent investment institutions, foreign
investors, etc. As a result, the equity structure of an enterprise could change.
Although privatisation of the entire enterprise was not allowed, it was possible
for non-state investors to hold the equity of the SOEs. This is clearly different
from the privatisation in countries like Russia and the Czech Republic. It only
diversified ownership structure of SOEs rather than selling existing stock of
assets to non-government investors. Thus, incidentally, the second stage of the
reform actually started the process of ownership diversification of China’s
SOEs.  This is a point often neglected by observers of China’s SOE reform. 
The third stage of China’s state enterprise reform involved extensive
ownership changes. By the mid 1990s, many SOEs ran into serious financial
difficulties and the urgency of the enterprise reform had become increasingly
acute. Building upon lessons from the previous two stages of reform, the
Chinese government began to formulate policies that amounted to privatisa-
tion or liquidation of some of the state enterprises. 
China’s long history of state enterprise reform provides the best
opportunity to test the two competing schools of thought of state enterprise
reform. Not only have different enterprises undergone different reforms, but
also individual enterprises have had different reform measures imposed on
them at the same time.
III DATAAND METHODOLOGY
The Data 
The data set we used is unique in the sense that it covers all three stages
of the reform. It is based on two surveys of 680 state enterprises covering the
period 1980–1994. The first survey was conducted in 1990 by a research team
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Oxford University, and the University of Michigan. The survey gathered enter-
prise information from 1980 to 1989. The second survey was implemented in
1995 by researchers from the CASS and the University of Michigan and
collected information on the same group of enterprises from 1990 to 1994. The
data cover four provinces, including Jilin, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and Sichuan,
representing four geographical regions of economic development in China.
(northeast, east, north, and west). The sample SOEs come from 39 industries,
which we grouped into five major industrial categories: mining and utilities,
heavy manufacturing, chemicals, light manufacturing, and others. Unlike
surveys conducted by government agencies, the two surveys were carefully
designed and pilot-tested by economics researchers. The data set contains
detailed information on the operations and financial information of the SOEs
in the sample. It also contains qualitative information from the senior
management of the SOEs. The first part of the data set has been widely used
in other studies (e.g., Groves et al., 1994, 1995; Li, 1997).
The Design of the Econometric Test 
We adopted the programme evaluation approach to test the propositions
based on the two schools of the enterprise reform. That is, we include in our
empirical model two sets of proxies that represent the measures for
managerial reform and ownership reforms respectively to see how these
proxies can explain changes in the performance of a state enterprise.
Specifically, the econometric model we use is as follows:
yit = fi + αm mit + αo oit + αz zit + εit   (1) 
where:
yit:  a measure of the performance of firm i at year t; 
fi:  the firm specific fixed effect variable which is not observed; 
mit:a   vector of measures of the managerial reform on firm i at year t; 
oit:a   measure of ownership changes in firm i at year t;
zit:a   vector of control variables of firm i at year t;
εit: the error term.
Measuring Enterprise Performance yit
For the performance measure yit , we used two alternative approaches. The
first is to measure the total factor productivity (TFP) of the enterprise. The
TFP is defined as the portion of a firm’s real output (after deflating prices to a
base year) that is not explained by real inputs, including labour, capital, and
raw materials. The TFP is a measure of a firm’s production efficiency, since it
relates a firm’s input and output after taking out any effects of price changes. 
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as capital, labour, and raw materials. After obtaining the TFP of a firm of each
year, we use model (1) to evaluate the impact of each reform measures. Equiv-
alently, we can combine the two steps by doing the following one regression
Log(Yit) = fi + αm mit + αo oit + αz zit
+ βl log(Lit)+ βl log(Kit)+ βl log(Mit) + ηit (2)
where:
Yit: real output; 
Lit:  size of labour force the enterprise; 
Kit:  capital of the firm;
Mit: raw  material.
ηit:  the error term,
TFP: fi + am mit + ao oit + az zit + ηit
Despite the fact that TFP has been used extensively as a measure of SOE
performance, it may not take into account changes in the behaviour of the firm
because it is based on production function of a firm. Under the assumption of
profit maximisation, other things being equal, a higher TFP means higher
efficiency. For state enterprises, which have non-profit objectives, it is possible
that a higher TFP induces a lower efficiency and waste of resources. Bai et al.
(1997) have developed a model to illustrate this possibility. 
Because of the possible deficiency of the TFP as the measure of SOE
performance, we introduce the gross rate of return on assets (GROA) as an
alternative measure in this study. The GROA is constructed as before-tax
profit based on market prices divided by the total net asset value of the firm.
The before-tax-profit is calculated by adjusting all raw material and output
prices to market prices and then dividing all by economy-wide inflation rate.
In addition, wage rates are adjusted by weeding out extra bonuses, which were
returns to employees’ de facto control rights of the state enterprise and should
be excluded from normal wage costs.  The net asset value is adjusted by per-
petual inventory method and by deflating the nominal value of investment of
each year.
The GROA based on market prices captures the total return to one unit of
investment available for division among the stakeholders. The stakeholders of
an SOE include employees, banks, government agencies, and other investors.
Thus, the GROA is a composite index of the economic efficiency of an
enterprise incorporating many factors. A change of behaviour of SOE
managers should be reflected in the GROA. A higher TFP coupled with profit
maximising decisions of an SOE also increases the GROR. Thus, it should be
more accurate than the TFP measurement. It is also more accurate than an
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to changes in the bonuses paid to SOE employees. 
Measuring Managerial Autonomy and Incentive mit
We  follow Groves et al. (1994) in measuring managerial autonomy and
incentive mit . For managerial autonomy, they used a dummy variable auto1it
that was equal to 1 if for firm i in year t, the director had obtained production
autonomy. Alternatively, we also use auto2it equalling the ratio of the
enterprise’s output sold in the market in total output.  The rest of the output
would go to the government at a planned price.
As the measure of incentives, we use the sum of the two contractual rates
of profit retention.  The first is the pre-agreed rate of profit retention for the
SOE and the other is the rate of profit retention if the total profit is beyond a
pre-determined level. We use the sum of these two since when the total profit
is high, the sum of the two rates is the expected rate of profit retention. This
is consistent with Groves et al. (1994).
Measuring Ownership Diversity oit
The index of ownership diversity, oit, was meant to capture the percentage
of non-government shares in the enterprise’s total capital stock. For this
purpose, we construct two series of capital stock for each enterprise. One is the
total capital stock constructed by the perpetual inventory method as in the
case of Kit in the production function. The other is the capital stock
constructed similarly by only using each year’s investment from non-
government sources. The ratio of the second capital stock to that of the first
one constitutes the ownership diversity index oit that falls between 0 and 1.
Control Variables zit
The main control variable we included in the regression was a measure of
product market competition since previous works have shown that this is an
important factor inducing a better performance among China’s state
enterprises in the reform era. Following Li (1997), we calculate the difference
between the growth of input price and output price for each year and each
enterprise. We use this value as a reverse index of the mark-up ratio.  That is,
a high growth difference indicates that the terms of trade of the firm worsens
and the lower the mark-up ratio.
IV RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTS 
Before discussing the test results, let us first take a look at the summary
statistics of the key variables used in our study.  Table 1 categorises those
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had gained more production autonomy over time in the reform period. In 1980,
on average, SOEs sold 44 per cent of their output to the market place while
that figure increased to 75 per cent in 1994. With more autonomy of
production and sales, SOEs in the sample could also keep more of the profit
generated. In 1980, SOEs in the sample were able to retain 22 per cent of
profit for their own use on average. The ratio steadily increased to 70 per cent
by 1994. Meanwhile, the proportion of non-government shares in total capital
stock increased at a much slower pace from 6 per cent in 1980 to about 27 per
cent in 1994. At same time, mark-up ratios were also decreasing as evidenced
by Table 1’s accumulated input inflation rates minus accumulated output
inflation rates. The difference in inflation rate peaked around the end of 1980s
and persisted at a high level until 1994.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Managerial Autonomy, Incentive, Ownership
Diversification, and Mark-up Ratios
Year Autonomy (%):  Profit  Ownership  Markup Ratio (%):
Percentage of  Share (%):  Fraction (%):  the Difference 
Output Sold at  Percentage  Percentage  Between
the Market in  of Retained  of Accumulative  Accumulative
the Total Output  Profit in the Non-state  Input Inflation
Value Total Profit Investment in  Rate and
the Accumulative Accumulative
Total Investment Output Inflation 
Rate
1980 44 22 6 0
1981 46 24 7 5
1982 48 27 7 6
1983 49 31 7 16
1984 51 36 8 19
1985 57 38 9 27
1986 59 41 10 43
1987 61 39 11 58
1988 62 40 13 95
1989 63 39 14 101
1990 72 61 18 97
1991 73 60 21 92
1992 74 63 24 87
1993 74 68 25 91
1994 75 70 27 73
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first column from the left is the rate of return on assets calculated by directly
using accounting data. It shows a dramatic decrease in the gross rate of return
on assets in nominal or accounting terms. The rate was as high as 54 per cent
in 1980 and dropped to as low as 14 per cent in 1990. The second column
makes an adjustment to the first column by using the 1994 prices of input and
output to reconstruct the gross profit. The gross profit is measured at the same
price level of 1994. Note that the calculated rate of return was very high in  the
early years of the reform period. This is due to the fact that the denominator,
the total asset value, was calculated at the price level of 1980.  Thus, the final
adjustment we made was to deflate the rate of return of the second column by
economy wide inflation rate. The outcome after adjustment still shows the
same picture, i.e., the gross rate of return on assets decreased from well above
20 per cent in the 1980s to under 20 per cent after 1990. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Various Rates of Return (GROA) by Year (in
percentage)
Year Nominal Market  Return on Total  GDP Deflated Return
Return on  Assets at 1994  on Total Assets at 
Total Assets  Market Prices 1994 Market Prices
1980 54 88 34
1981 46 78 32
1982 43 73 28
1983 40 79 30
1984 43 84 36
1985 19 40 18
1986 19 47 22
1987 21 52 26
1988 23 60 35
1989 16 36 24
1990 14 29 19
1991 14 25 17
1992 15 22 16
1993 19 24 21
1994 18 18 18
Note: The asset value is calculated by perpetual inventory method taking
depreciation into account. 
We are now ready to describe the regression results. Table 3 shows the
regression results based on the total factor productivity model. Production
autonomy, whether it is measured by a dummy variable of obtaining the
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insignificant in all regressions. Profit incentive, as measured by profit shares,
is statistically significant in all regressions. The coefficients on non-
government shares of ownership as well as mark-up ratios are all statistically
significant. Moreover, the ownership shares and mark-up ratios are of higher
order in economic importance than profit shares. For example, for an increase
of 50 per cent in profit share, the one time TFP increase is around 3 per cent;
for the same amount of increase in non-government ownership share or mark-
up ratio, the TFP increase would be 9 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively.
Interestingly, the cross-effect of autonomy and ownership is statistically
insignificant while that between profit share and ownership is negative and
statistically significant.
Turning to the average TFP growth, we need to look at the second column
of Table 3, which shows a regression of logarithm of deflated output on that of
labour, capital, and deflated raw material, and time trend. The coefficients on
logarithm of labour, capital, and raw material are all statistically significant
and are of appropriate values. They add up to a level close to 0.98, suggesting
a proximity to a constant return to scale in production technology. The
coefficient of the time trend captures the annual growth rate of TFP, which
turns out to be statistically significant at more than 1 per cent level. The
estimated TFP growth rate of the SOEs in our sample is 3.2 per cent, which is
very close to those reported in may studies on Chinese SOEs’ TFP growth in
the literature.
The regression results using the gross rate of return on assets are given in
Table 4. The results show the same pattern as those in the TFP regressions.
Production autonomy does not have a stable positive and statistically
significant effect across alternative regression models. Profit share retention
is mostly statistically insignificant except for one specification of the
regression. Meanwhile, ownership share and mark-up ratio are consistently
and positively significant across the regressions. In addition, they are
economically significant. For example, an increase of 50 per cent in non-
government ownership share and mark-up ratio, the gross rate of return
would jump by 40 and 13 per cent, respectively. Finally, estimates on the cross-
effect between autonomy and ownership share are not stable, while the same
between profit share and ownership share tend to be negative.
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12. Li & Wu article  25/6/02  3:09 pm  Page 144Overall, the two sets of empirical tests yield the following conclusions.
First, ownership diversification has economically large and positive impact on
the performance of state enterprises. Second, managerial autonomy and profit
incentives do not have the same consistent and positive impact. Third, product
market competition improves the performance of state enterprises. 
V CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the paper, we test two schools of thought on strategies of state
enterprise reform, the ownership school and the management school.  We are
able to do so by utilising a large panel dataset of state enterprises in China,
which has experimented with a wide range of strategies in reforming the state
enterprises. We find that ownership diversification has a consistent and
economically significant impact on improving the performance of state enter-
prises while strategies of management reform including granting production
autonomy and profit incentives do not have a persistent and economically
significant effect on enterprise performance.
Our empirical findings carry important policy implications. Managerial
reforms might have some positive impact in the short run but cannot achieve
their objectives in the long run. Diversification of the ownership structure of
state enterprises is a key to improving the economic performance of
enterprises. As the ownership changes carry a significant impact on the
economic performance of state-owned enterprises, any reform strategy should
put the ownership change as the priority in the reform agenda. Although
autonomy and incentives clearly matter, the policy makers should not be
preoccupied by those measures. Our finding on the impact of firm performance
on market competition and development of market institutions suggests that
gradualism may be a viable alternative to reform the state-owned enterprises.
One of the undesirable consequences of massive privatisation without a
competitive environment is the shrinking of economic activities and high
unemployment. China’s experiences shows that privatisation at the margin
facilitates a smooth transition.
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